St. John's Law Review
Volume 27
Number 1 Volume 27, December 1952, Number
1

Article 7

Marketability of Title by Adverse Possession in New York
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1952]

NOTES
MARKETABILITY OF TITLE BY ADVERSE POSSESSION
IN

NEW YORK

Introduction
"Title by adverse possession sounds, at first blush, like title by
theft or robbery, a primitive method of acquiring land without paying for it." 1 Frequently, the most exhaustive explanation of the
public policy necessitating prescription statutes, 2 fails to convince the
layman of the stability of a title acquired in this manner. This skeptical attitude often induces prospective purchasers of realty to by-pass
a prescriptive title for one of record. 3 The prospective vendee's reluctance is not without basis. Whereas record titles and their histories are readily available for inspection in the public registry, an
adverse possessor's title, and the proof thereof, is recorded only in
the files of human memory. Thus as the length of the adverse possession extends, the probability of proving a valid title thereby is
proportionately weakened.
The vendor's title may factually meet all the criteria necessary
to move a court of equity to declare his title marketable and thus
grant specific performance but mustering sufficient proof thereof may
border on impossibility. However, while the court may stamp such
title marketable, the reluctant purchaser will, in all probability, be
unable to market it with facility.
The most pertinent questions which present themselves to both
parties are: 1. What circumstances influence the court in its determination of a title's marketability? 2. Is there any method by which
outstanding dormant claims to the property may be determined and
the proof of the adverse possessor's title perpetuated?
Acquiring a Marketable Title
Of paramount importance in determining a title's marketability,
is the establishment of the facts upon which the title is allegedly
based. 4 Although it would seem that the requisites for acquiring
I Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession, 32

HARV. L. REv. 135 (1918).

2The purpose of the adverse possession doctrine is not to reward the

diligent or penalize the negligent but rather to ". .

automatically . . . quiet

all titles which are openly and consistently asserted, to provide proof of meritorious titles, and correct errors in conveyancing." Ibid.
3 Titles held by adverse possession are in disfavor with prospective purchasers of real property. See Crocker Point Ass'n v. Gouraud, 224 N. Y. 343,
350, 120 N. E. 737, 738 (1918).
4 The possession must be continuous, open, notorious and hostile to the

claim of the true owner.
239 (1920); WALSr,

See Belotti v. Bickhardt, 228 N. Y. 296, 127 N. E.

THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 784 (2d ed. 1937).

A title

by adverse possession must be clearly shown to have complied with all these
conditions before it can be marketable. See Bliss v. Johnson, 94 N. Y. 235,
241 (1883).
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title under the ancient doctrine of adverse possession would, by this
time, be well established, judicial dispute remains. A recent Court
of Appeals decision, 5 by a four to three vote, revitalized a heretofore
present but neglected element for acquiring a prescriptive title, viz.,
claim of right." The result in that case tends to complicate matters
concerning the facts necessary to be present to establish that statutory requisite. When a determination of the elements necessary to
constitute an effective adverse possession foments a vigorous dissent
in the highest court of a state, it is easily understandable why the
prescriptive owner suffers from a feeling of "title insecurity."
Assuming that the adverse possessor has fulfilled all the requirements, and he is now invested with a good title, 7 does it follow that
this title is marketable. Prior to the merger of law and equity there
existed an important distinction between a good title and a marketable
title. In a suit at law, to recover a down payment made pursuant
to a contract for the purchase of real property, a judgment would
be rendered for the defendant-vendor if he could show good title in
himself.8 At law it was the actual validity or invalidity of the vendor's title which governed; the presence of invalid claims to the
realty did not detrimentally affect the defendant's title. 9
5Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, 304 N. Y. 95, 106 N. E. 2d 28 (1952).

6 Under the early New York law, "claim of title" was an essential element to a valid adverse possession in addition to the other requirements. Smith

v. Burtis, 9 Johns. 174 (N. Y. 1812).

Later cases, however, presumed the

"claim of right" from the existence of the ordinary elements, open, notorious

cultivation, etc. See La Frambois v. Jackson, 8 Cow. 589, 603 (N. Y. 1826).
In the recent case of Van Valkenburgh v. Lutz, supra note 5, the court has
revived the old rule requiring "claim of right" as a separate element, without

defining "claim of right."
7Baker v. Oakwood, 123 N. Y. 16, 25 N. E. 312 (1890); see Millard v.
McMullin, 68 N. Y. 345, 350 (1877). Since a "lost" grant is presumed in

these cases, title founded upon adverse possession is sufficient to enable its

holder to maintain ejectment even against the record or former owner. See
Barnes v. Light, 116 N. Y. 34, 37, 22 N. E. 441, 442 (1889). Many states

have a "vesting" type statute which expressly takes the title from the true
owner and vests it in the adverse possessor. In New York, however, the governing statute is merely a statute of limitations cutting off the true owners

remedy after 15 years. But case law in New York has given the same effect
to adverse possession as those states which have a "vesting" type statute. See
WAL H, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 783 (2d ed. 1937).
8 See Romilly v. James, 6 Taunt. 274, 128 Eng. Rep. 1035 (1815). Prior
to the merger of law and equity, a good title, at law, meant one against which
there existed no valid claim. If a claim against the property could be shown
to be invalid the title would be good and the purchaser could not recover his
down payment. But in equity the actual validity or invalidity of the claim
did not control since equity would not compel a purchaser to take a title
which might involve him in future litigation, regardless of the probable outcome of the dispute. See Brokaw v. Duffy, 165 N. Y. 391, 398, 59 N. E. 196,
198 (1901); WALSH, EQUITY 381 (1930); CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY

172 (2d ed. 1948).

See The Methodist Episcopal Church Home v. Thompson, 108 N. Y.
618, 620, 15 N. E. 193, 195 (1888), citing Romilly v. James, supra note 8 at
1040. CLARa, PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY, supra note 8.
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Equity courts, however, recognized a distinction between good
and marketable titles. 10 Notwithstanding the actual validity of the
title, an equity court would deny a vendor's bill for specific performance if it reasonably appeared that the purchaser might subsequently become embroiled in litigation." Although the probability
that the purchaser would be successful in the litigation was great, it
did not enhance the title's marketability, since it was felt that equity
should not compel a vendee to purchase a lawsuit. 1 2

Thus, it be-

came apparent that a title may be good in fact, and yet not marketable.' 3 The rule established, subsequent to the merger of law and
equity, is well settled. If nothing is stated to the contrary, a contract for the sale of land is not fully performed unless
the vendor
4
tenders a title which is both good and marketable.
Establishing Marketability
The first task facing the plaintiff-vendor in his action for specific
performance is that of proving his title. Clear proof of adverse possession for the requisite number of years, absent any outstanding
claim or suspicion of a claim, makes a title which a purchaser may
not refuse.15 Stronger, clearer proof of a prescriptive title is required of the vendor, in these suits, than would be necessary for him
to produce in defending an action of ejectment brought by the record
owner.16 Concerning the quantum of the evidence required of the
vendor in his suit for specific performance, one court has said,
"... the proof should be so clear, as to the ability of the vendor to
convey the title, as to render it the duty of a court to instruct a jury
to find the fact of its existence." IT
In the extreme cases, where marketability or unmarketability is
patent, there is little divergence of opinion. Thus, where adverse
10 See Pound, The Progress of the Law, 33
Note, 22 No=Rs DAmE LAw. 127, 129 (1946).

I-IARv. L.

Rzv. 929, 933 (1920);

11See Moore v. Williams, 115 N. Y. 586, 592, 22 N. E. 233, 234 (1889).
'12Ibid.

13 Id. at 597, 22 N. E. at 236; Irving v. Campbell, 121 N. Y. 353, 358, 24
N. E. 821, 822 (1890) ; see also note 8 supra.
14 See The Methodist Episcopal Church Home v. Thompson, supra note 9.
"Why should a purchaser be compelled to pay for a title he is not bound to
take?" Moore v. Williams, supra note 11 at 597, 22 N. E. at 236. See
also Brokaw v. Duffy, 165 N. Y. 391, 398, 59 N. E. 196, 198 (1901); Burwell
v. Jackson, 9 N. Y. 535, "542 (1854).
15 See Wilkinson v. Schwartz, 217 App. Div. 797, 216 N. Y. Supp. 771 (3d
Dep't 1926); Condon v. Quigley, 209 App. Div. 362, 204 N. Y. Supp. 611
(1st Dep't 1924) ; Lewine v. Gerardo, 60 Misc. 261, 112 N. Y. Supp. 192 (Sup.
Ct. 1908); Grady v. Ward, 20 Barb. 543, 546 (N. Y. 1855).
16 See Carey v. Riley, 121 Misc. 234, 236, 201 N. Y. Supp. 151, 153 (Sup.
Ct. 1923).
17 See Carey v. Riley, 121 Misc. 234, 236, 201 N. Y. Supp. 151, 153 (Sup.
Ct. 1923); Ottinger v. Strasburger, 33 Hun 466, 469 (N. Y. 1884), aff'd, 102
N. Y. 692 (1886).
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possession for forty-five years was clearly shown with no outstand-8
ing claim or suspicion of a claim, the title was held marketable.'
But, where a vendor of property claimed a fourteen-foot strip by
adverse possession, the fact that the record owner still claimed title
and purported to hold a lease given by the vendor's wife, cast the
title into such doubt that it was held unmarketable. 19 It is in the
middle areas, where the titles' marketability is latent, that most of
the dissension occurs.
Where the adverse possessor formerly held the property as a
joint tenant or a tenant in common, an objection frequently raised to
his title is the possibility of a co-tenant's claim to the property remaining. In Kielbinski v. Sitko,20 it was held that the mere fact
that the plaintiff's testator, who was formerly a tenant in common,
had been in exclusive possession for more than twenty-eight years
did not, per se, render his title marketable. When one seeks to establish adverse possession against his co-tenants, he must show either
an ouster in fact or one presumed from an exclusive possession under
claim of full ownership of which all the co-tenants have knowledge.
Since there exists a presumption that a tenant occupies the property
with the permission of his co-tenants, in order to establish a title by
adverse possession, the former's hostile occupancy would have to be
known to the latter.2 '
Usually, where a faulty description in the deed offered by the
plaintiff-vendor can only be cured by parol evidence that he has adversely possessed the omitted or misdescribed parcels for the requisite
period, the title will be unmarketable. 22 This result follows logically
under a written infrom the rule that the extent of a claim of title 23
strument is measured by the description therein.
Further Difficulties
As previously noted, a marketable title is one which is reasonably free from the risk of future litigation. 24 Therefore, where it is
Is Grady v. Ward, 20 Barb. 543 (N. Y. 1855).
19 fBattle v. Calavitta, 132 Misc. 48, 228 N. Y. Supp. 624 (Sup. Ct. 1928).
20 194 Misc. 408, 87 N. Y. S. 2d 277 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
21 A recent amendment to the Civil Practice Act, to enhance the marketability of titles claimed by former co-tenants, has limited this presumption of
dual occupancy to fifteen years. Thus, apparently thirty years of exclusive
possession would seem to destroy the possibility of co-tenant's claims to the
property remaining. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACr § 41-a. See 1949 LEG. Doc. No.
5(J), REPoRT, N. Y. LAw RmlSION CommissioN 709 (1949).

Compare
22 See Heller v. Cohen, 154 N. Y. 299, 48 N. E. 527 (1895).
Hartley v. James, 50 N. Y. 38, 42 (1872), wit/h Ottinger v. Strasburger, 33
Hun 466, 469 (N. Y. 1884), aff'd, 102 N. Y. 692 (1886).
23 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 37.
24See McAndrew v. Lanphear, 280 App. Div. 6, 9, 111 N. Y. S. 2d 238,
242 (4th Dep't 1952); Holdridge v. Roberts, 195 Misc. 646, 647, 89 N. Y. S.
2d 619, 621 (Sup. Ct. 1949) ; Simis v. McElroy, 160 N. Y. 156, 162, 54 N. E.
674, 675 (1899).
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established that remaindermen, 25 heirs or devisees 26 were in existence
at the time the record owner lost his title to the land to the vendor
by reason of that person's adverse possession,27 the onus is upon the
vendor to show that these persons are barred from asserting their

claims, either by death or by operation of law.2 s

In New York, the

real property statute of limitations does not begin to run against infants until they have reached their majority. 29 Thus, the vendor
assumes a burden in attempting to show that there is no one presently under disability, who may present a legal claim to the property in the future.30 This task frequently defies accomplishment.
However, the impossibility of proof 3 ' does not excuse its failure.
* . [I]f after the vendor has produced all the proof that
he can,
a rational doubt still remains, a title is not marketable." 32
In the leading New York case of Simis v. McElroy,33 remainder
interests in the property in question were limited to the heirs of the
record owner in his will. It did not appear that the mesne conveyances to the plaintiff's remote grantor included the interest of all the
remaindermen. Holding the title to be unmarketable, the court
reasoned that since the statute of limitations does not begin to run
against heirs, taking title by will or descent, until their right of entry
has accrued or while they were under any disability, nor against remainderrnen until the termination of the prior estate, a mere showing
of thirty years adverse possession would not negate the possibility
of future litigation.34 Thus, the doubt cast upon the plaintiff's title
must be dispelled by showing that the objections of the defendant
have no probable basis. 3r
The case of Freedinan v. Oppenheim 30 illustrates the type of
proof required to quiet these doubts. In that case the plaintiff produced deeds from four of the five record owners plus strong evidence
25 See Fleming -v. Burnham and Sternberger, 100 N. Y. 1, 2 N. E. 905
(1885) ; Simis v. McElroy, supra note 24.
26 See Fuhr v. Cronin, 82 App. Div. 210, 81 N. Y. Supp. 536 (1st Dep't
1903) ; Kahn v. Mount, 46 App. Div. 84, 61 N. Y. Supp. 358 (1st Dep't 1899);
Ferry v. Sampson, 112 N. Y. 415, 20 N. E. 387 (1889).
27 See note 7 supra.
28 Carolan v. Yoran, 104 App. Div. 488, 491, 93 N. Y. Supp. 935, 937 (1st
Dep't 1905), aff'd, 186 N. Y. 575, 79 N. E. 1102 (1906).
29 N. Y. CIv. PRAc. ACT § 43; see Simis v. McElroy, 160 N. Y. 156, 163,
54 N. E. 674, 675 (1899).
30 Carolan v. Yoran, 104 App. Div. 488, 93 N. Y. Supp. 935 (1st Dep't
1905),
aff'd, 186 N. Y. 575, 79 N. E. 1102 (1906).
3
1 See Simis v. McElroy, supra note 29.
32 Schriver v. Schriver, 86 N. Y. 575, 584 (1881).
33 160 N. Y. 156, 54 N. E. 674 (1899).
34 Id. at 163, 54 N. E. at 675.
35 Id. at 163, 164, 54 N. E. at 675, 676. In explaining the harshness of this
requirement, the court points out that the vendor may always describe the
title he holds to the vendee, and if he agrees to take it, he will be bound.
38187 N. Y. 101, 79 N. E. 841 (1907).
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that the fifth owner, who was an infant, and might possibly assert a
claim against the property, had died.3 7 This removed any reasonable
doubt affecting the marketability of the title. Other cases, in determining the legal effect to be given prescriptive titles, have, by a process of mathematical calculations, declared them to be marketable
when it appeared that the passage of time negated the possibility of
an assertable claim outstanding.38 Of course, this discretionary rule
is carefully guarded and exercised only where the case is free from
all reasonable doubt.3 9
In an early New York case, fifty-two years of adverse possession was held not sufficient, by itself, to negate the possibility of
future claims arising from formerly disabled persons. 40 The court
felt that since the question was one of fact, its solution must be
doubtful and a purchaser should not be compelled to take a title in
respect to which such a doubt exists. 4 - The general dissatisfaction of the court with such titles was expressed in these words:
"[w]here all things are unknown, who can say that anything
is improbable?" 42 Experience shows that titles based upon adverse
possession have been subject to dispute from unexpected quarters
because the claimant was previously under some disability which had
tolled the statute of limitations. 43 Similarly, where it appears that
heirs or remaindermen were in existence during the alleged adverse
possession, the plaintiff's burden of showing a marketable title becomes infinitely heavier.
"Absolute certainty is seldom attainable in human affairs; in
titles to land almost never." 4- But public policy demands that alienation of land be facilitated whenever possible. 45 Therefore, the courts
in deciding that a vendor's title, acquired by adverse possession, is
marketable, have considered as de minimis a vendee's objection
founded upon some ".

.

. remote contingency, which, according to

102, 79 N. E. at 842.
38 Sixty-one years of adverse possession had "...
cut the heart out of the
possibility of renewal.... ." Norwegian Evangelical Free Church v. Milhauser,
252 N. Y. 186, 189, 169 N. E. 134, 135 (1929). Where a woman took title to
the land at the age of twenty-one and had raised no objection to the vendor's
possession for eighty-five years, the court held the title marketable since in
all probability she was dead. This, and other considerations, prompted the
court to rule that no doubt existed as to the validity of plaintiff's title. Forsyth
v. Leslie, 74 App. Div. 517, 77 N. Y. Supp. 826 (4th Dep't 1902) ; see Hamershlag v. Duryea, 58 App. Div. 288, 292, 68 N. Y. Supp. 1061, 1064 (1st Dep't
1901),
aff'd mene., 172 N. Y. 622, 65 N. E. 1117 (1902).
39 See Norwegian Evangelical Free Church v. Milhauser, supra note 38;
Ferry v. Sampson, 112 N. Y. 415, 418, 20 N. E. 387, 389 (1889).
40 Shultz v. Rose, 65 How. Prac. 75 (N. Y. 1883).
37 Id. at

41 Id. at 78.

42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.

4 Grady v. Ward, 20 Barb. 543, 546 (N. Y. 1855).

45 Ballantine,

Title by Adverse Possession, 32 HAav. L. REv. 135 (1918).
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ordinary experience, has no basis ..

" 40

The doubt necessary to

render the title unmarketable must be more than a ".

.

. mere sus-

picion ending in a suspicion." 47 What constitutes a reasonable doubt
cannot be reduced to fixed and definite principles, for it varies with
the circumstances of each case,48 and it is sufficient to justify the
court in withholding this peculiar relief [specific performance] that
upon close scrutiny the title seems doubtful." 49
Marketable in Fact?
The court in Wanser v. DeNyse,50 refusing to grant specific performance, declared that "[t] he purchaser . . . should not be com-

pelled to take a title that will not be accepted by an ordinarily prudent man when the property is again offered for sale or as security
for a loan." 51 Apparently this test has not been strictly followed
in later cases which have declared prescriptive titles marketable, in
spite of the fact that experience indicates that this class of titles is
not looked upon with favor by trustees of savings banks or insurance
companies, 52 nor by prospective purchasers of real property. 3 The
phrase, "marketable title," has apparently acquired a dual meaning.
The equity court's declaration does not affect the actual marketability
of the title. Neither the record owner nor those claiming under him
are bound by any finding of marketability at the specific performance
proceeding.54 Furthermore, the method frequently employed to induce the "reasonably prudent man" to purchase property acquired
by adverse possession indicates the unpopularity of these titles. The
nature of the vendor's title is not revealed until the day of title closing and, should the vendee, upon learning the true facts, refuse to
perform, a bill is instituted in equity to compel him to do so.r 5
46

See Ferry 'v. Sampson, supra note 39.

Y. 575, 583 (1881).
41
4 8 See Schriver v. Schriver, 86 N.

Id. at 584.
49 See Shultz v. Rose, 65 How. Prac. 75, 76 (N. Y. 1883).
50188 N. Y. 378, 80 N. E. 1088 (1907).
51 Id.at 380, 80 N. E. at 1088.
52 See Heller v. Cohen, 15 Misc. 378, 381, 36 N. Y. Supp. 668, 670 (Sup.
Ct. 51895),
aff'd, 154 N. Y. 299, 48 N. E. 527 (1897).
3
See Crocker Point Ass'n v. Gouraud, 224 N. Y. 343, 350, 120 N. E.
737, 738 (1918) ; Lincoln Savings Bank v. Schneider, 105 Misc. 530, 534, 174
N. Y. Supp. 529, 531 (Sup. Ct. 1919).
54 Neither the person holding record title nor those claiming under him are
parties to the specific performance action and therefore they are not precluded
from suit by the determination in that action. See Simis v. McElroy, 160
N. Y. 156, 161, 54 N. E. 674, 675 (1899); Fleming v. Burnham and Sternberger, 100 N. Y. 1, 10, 2 N. E. 905, 907 (1886); Battle v. Calavitta, 132
Misc. 48, 50, 228 N. Y. Supp. 624, 628 (Sup. Ct. 1928). See Pound, The
Progressof the Law, 33 HARv. L. REv. 929 (1920).
55 The vendee does not know the nature of the title he has contracted for
until the closing day. At that time, he is given affidavits as proof of this title
and perhaps a few other details concerning its validity. See Crocker Point
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Insurance
Insurance has become an increasingly popular form of title protection in recent years. Contract clauses requiring an "insurable
title" from the vendor are not necessarily satisfied by what an equity
court considers a marketable title; 5 it must be one which a designated or recognized title company will insure.5 7 The refusal of a
title company to insure gives the vendee a right to recover his down
payment. 58 Since a title insurance company has a right to choose
its own risks,5 9 it is doubtful whether it will insure a title acquired
by adverse possession, resting as it does upon parol evidence and
questions of fact. 0° The fact that a title is uninsurable detracts from
its actual marketability.
Solution-§§ 500-509 Real Property Law
There are four major factors which may obstruct the actual
marketability of titles acquired by adverse possession: 1. The existence of a title on record, valid on its face, inconsistent with the
vendor's claim of title. 2. The absence of any recordable proof of
vendor's title. 3. The gnawing suspicion of outstanding claims accruing to heirs or remaindermen against whom the statute of limitations has not run. 4. The absence of a method for perpetuating the
testimony and proof of the adverse possession.
The most comprehensive solution to these problems may be
found in Sections 500-509 of the Real Property Law, 6' under which
62
an action to determine claims to real property may be brought.
Ass'n v. Gouraud, mipra note 53.
pany the title should be clear and
151, 123 N. E. 205, 206 (1919).
dence is "clear and cogent" until

The evidence collected and ready to accomcogent. Trimboli v. Kinkel, 226 N. Y. 147,
How is the vendee to know that the evihe has had time to investigate? His first

real assurance of its probative value arrives with the unfavorable decree of

specific performance. See Wildove v. Papa, 223 App. Div. 211, 217, 228 N. Y.
Supp. 211, 218 (3d Dep't 1928) (dissenting opinion).
56 See Gilchrest House, Inc. v. Guaranteed Title and Mortgage Co., 277
App. Div. 788, 789, 97 N. Y. S. 2d 226, 228 (2d Dep't 1950), aff'd inem., 302
N. Y. 852, 100 N. E. 2d 46 (1951).
57 Weiss v. Sachs, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
58 Friedman v. Handelman, 300 N. Y. 188, 90 N. E. 2d 31 (1949).
59 Gilchrest House, Inc. v. Guaranteed Title and Mortgage Co., supra note
56.
60 Title insurance companies usually prefer title of record which they can

search with comparative ease. Adverse possession under color of title might
suffice.
6i N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 500-509.
62 Formerly, ejectment was the classic method of trying titles. See Porcher
v. Frueauff, 82 N. Y. S. 2d 10, 11 (Sup. Ct. 1948), aff'd iner., 95 N. Y. S.
2d 603 (1st Dep't 1950), appeal disnissed, 302 N. Y. 697, 98 N. E. 2d 489
(1951). An action in ejectment to try title, however, would not preclude
heirs, remaindermen, idiots, infants, etc. See note 54 supra. The Torrens
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These sections were enacted as "... a medium by which one in possession under claim of title 63 may 'smoke out' a threatening but otherwise inactive adverse claimant and force him to his proof, to the
end that, if such adverse claimant fails to show good title in himself, 64 he is forever silenced." 65 The judgment rendered in this action, determining who has title to the property, is conclusive upon
each party to the action and every person claiming from, through or
under him. 66 It has the additional advantage of being conclusive
upon infants and idiots. 67 The statute contains provisions for service by publication,68 similar to those relating to mortgage foreclosure, thereby permitting the action to be commenced against persons known or unknown.6 9 At the conclusion of the action the
plaintiff, if successful, has a court adjudication establishing his title
which he may put on record. 70 No longer must the adverse possessor wait until his title is challenged in order to have its validity
adjudicated. By instituting an action pursuant to Sections 500-509,
the testimony supporting
the validity of his title can be reduced to a
71
final judgment.
The statute, in its present form, leaves a few details to be desired. There are no provisions for clearing the record of a prior
invalid deed in the same action. It is infrequently utilized for the
determination of titles to land held by adverse possession, perhaps
because the statute does not readily indicate its availability for this
purpose. 72 In 1948 an addition was made to Section 500 which provides for the cancellation of mortgages invalidated by the statute of
limitations. 73 A similar amendment, clarifying the procedure for determining outstanding claims to realty held by adverse possession
and incorporating therein a provision for the cancellation of invalid
system of title registration presents another possible solution to this problem
but the system, as adopted in New York, is in general disfavor and is inadequate for its intended purposes. See Current Comment, 15 N. Y. U. L. Q.
Rv. 545 (1938).
63

See note 6 supra.

The person claiming an interest in the land cannot prevail merely by
showing the weakness of the plaintiff possessor's title. See George v. People,
64

267 App. Div. 575, 577, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 681, 683 (2d Dep't 1944).
65 Id. at 577, 47 N. Y. S. 2d at 683.
66 N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 507.
67 Ibid.
Gs rd. § 505.
69 Id. § 500.
70 Id.

§ 297-b.
By this method the proof of the title by adverse possession, with its
boundaries and testimonies is perpetuated. Thus, the proof of title no longer
depends upon fallible memory or ex patrte affidavits.
72 One of the few cases involving an action pursuant to §§ 500-509 of the
N. Y. Real Property Law, where the plaintiff's title rested on adverse posses71

sion is Park Acres, Inc. v. City of New York, 36 N. Y. S. 2d 458 (Sup. Ct.

1942),3 aff'd mere., 266 App. Div. 849, 42 N. Y. S. 2d 236 (2d Dep't 1943).
7 N. Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 500(4).
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titles on record, would be a helpful addition to the law of real
property.
Equity courts should take cognizance of the fact that the best
evidence of a title's actual marketability is a judgment pursuant to
Sections 500-509. Specific performance should be denied where the
vendor fails to produce such evidence. While this may seem unduly
harsh, it must be remembered that the vendor could have avoided
74
litigation by revealing and describing his title in the contract of sale.
He should not now be permitted to foist a title upon the vendee
which that person would probably not have contracted for had he
known all the facts. The equitable maxim, "He who seeks equity
must do equity," should act as a guide to the court in its determination of these cases.

74

See Simis v. McElroy, 160 N. Y. 156, 163, 54 N. E. 674, 676 (1899).

